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Many scholars have discussed Judaism and the ethics of George Eliot in Daniel Deronda, 
but few have explored the impact of Buddhism upon the novel.  This thesis is the first 
study to demonstrate the influence of Buddhism upon George Eliot’s fiction.  By tracing 
Eliot’s interest in the emerging field of comparative religion, I argue that Buddhism 
offered Eliot a unique religion that was compatible with her secular humanism.  Although 
Buddhism appears explicitly in Deronda in only a few instances, I contend that Eliot uses 
the tradition of Jewish mysticism known as Kabbalism as the predominate theology in 
Deronda because it contains many affinities with Buddhism, most notably the doctrine of 
the transmigration of souls.  Mordecai interprets the transmigration of souls as a 
teleological justification for Jewish nationalism, but I assert that for Eliot, the 
transmigration of souls challenges national boundaries and instead promotes a universal 
compassion that extends to all cultures.  I argue that Eliot employs many voices of Jewish 
dissent in Deronda to illustrate the difficulty of reconciling cultural heritage with 
universal compassion strictly in terms of Judaism, and then I draw upon a metaphor in 
which Eliot compares Deronda to the Buddha to suggest that Deronda and his mission to 
re-establish Israel are antithetical to Eliot’s vision of universal compassion. 
 Chapter one reviews Deronda scholarship about Judaism, including work by 
Edward Said, Amanda Anderson, and Nancy Henry.  This chapter reads these scholars in 
terms of particular Eliot letters, notes, and moments in Deronda and Impressions of 
Theophrastus Such and asserts that Jewish nationalism in Deronda precludes universal 
compassion.  Chapter two chronicles Eliot’s adoption of secular humanism and then 
argues that Buddhism offers both the cultural solidarity that Eliot prizes in Judaism as 
well as the universal compassion inherent in Eliot’s secular humanism.  The conclusion 
of this thesis asserts that the renunciation of the ego in Buddhism attracts Eliot, and it 
proposes that contextualizing Deronda in terms of Eliot’s conceptions of Buddhism helps 
resolve some of the tension between Judaism and compassion in the novel. 
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Chapter I:  Introduction 
 
John Lord once wrote in Beacon Lights of History (1883) that George Eliot “writes 
almost like a follower of the Buddha.  The individual soul is absorbed into the universal 
whole… the great problems of existence are invested with gloom as well as mystery” 
(Lord 4: 388-89).1  Lord’s comments at first seem eccentric.  After all, Eliot never 
professed herself to be a Buddhist, and by all accounts, she never corresponded with any 
Buddhists.  Lord, however, claims that his basis for associating Eliot with Buddhism lies 
in Eliot’s ethics of compassion and renunciation.  He observes that Maggie Tulliver in 
Mill on the Floss (1860) “is only rescued by a supreme effort of self-renunciation—a 
principle which runs through all of George Eliot’s novels in which we see the doctrines 
of Buddha rather than those of Paul, although at times they seem to run into each other” 
(Lord 4: 369).  Lord specifically categorizes Eliot’s ideas about renunciation as Buddhist, 
but he also observes that Buddhism shares some affinities with Christianity.  Thus, 
Buddhism for Lord is not simply an exotic superstition practiced in the Far East; it is a 
religious system congruent with some aspects of Western theology.  A couple of crucial 
questions thus arise from Lord’s comments:  how do Buddhist ethics of compassion 
intersect with Western religions during the Victorian era, and why did George Eliot 
integrate Buddhism into the ethical paradigms of her fiction? 
 Compassion and renunciation are not unique to Buddhism.  All major world 
religions incorporate compassion and renunciation into their mythologies.  Lord, 






however, asserts that Buddhism offers a unique, non-theistic paradigm of compassion 
that complements Eliot’s agnostic humanism:  “In [Middlemarch] is brought out the 
blended stoicism, humanitarianism, Buddhism, and agnosticism of the author.  She paints 
“the struggle of noble natures, struggling vainly against the currents of a poor kind of 
world, without trust in an invisible Rock higher than themselves” (Lord 381).  According 
to Lord, Buddhism therefore contains an ethical system that emphasizes compassion and 
renunciation without any necessary presumption of a deity.  Eliot endorses this 
humanistic version of God in an 1874 letter to Mrs. Frederick Ponsonby: 
But I fear that any such limited considerations as I could put before you… could 
hardly have much more efficacy than what you have found in my books, which 
have for their main bearing a conclusion the opposite of that in which your studies 
seem to have painfully imprisoned you—a conclusion without which I could not 
have cared to write any representation of life—namely, that the fellowship 
between man and man which has been the principle of development, social and 
moral, is not dependent on conceptions of what is not man:  and that the idea of 
God, so far as it has been a high spiritual influence, is the ideal of a goodness 
entirely human (i.e., an exaltation of the human).  (GEL 6: 98) 
According to Eliot, the entire purpose of her literature is to foster universal compassion 
between all men and to eradicate any notion of the Divine that does not derive from the 
Goodness of men.  Buddhism, according to Lord, therefore offers Eliot a religious system 
purged of God that grounds its ethics upon human compassion and the renunciation of the 
ego rather than divine edict. 
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 Eliot first incorporates Buddhism into her fiction in Middlemarch when the 
narrator compares Celia’s baby (Arthur) to the Buddha:  “‘We should not grieve, should 
we, baby?’ said Celia confidently to the unconscious centre and poise of the world, who 
had the most remarkable fists… and hair enough, really, when you took his cap off, to 
make—you didn’t know what—in short, he was Bouddha in Western form” 
(Middlemarch 468).  Eliot then wrote of the passage to Mrs. Congreve in 1872:  “Four or 
five months ago it happens that I was writing some playfulness [my emphasis] about a 
baby and a baby’s hair, which is now in print” (GEL 5: 288).  Eliot’s facetious tone in the 
Middlemarch passage and her admission to playfulness in the letter appear to distance her 
from any serious engagement with Buddhist ethics, but nevertheless, Eliot refers to 
Arthur twice more as the Buddha in Middlemarch with less playful intonations.  In 
chapter fifty-four, Dorothea is unable to recognize Arthur as the “Bouddha” (508), and in 
chapter eighty-four, Arthur “was being drawn in his chariot, and, as became the infantine 
Bouddha, was sheltered by his sacred umbrella” (775).  Eliot’s comparison of Arthur 
with the Buddha in Middlemarch does not seem to indicate any significant impact  on the 
ethics of Eliot, but the passages with Arthur and the Buddha do reveal that Eliot is 
familiar with Buddhist lore.  Arthur’s ride in a chariot with the sacred umbrella shows 
that Eliot knows the Buddha was a prince, and her choice of the word “poise” to connect 
Arthur with the Buddha demonstrates that she is familiar with the Buddhist virtue of 
equanimity.  Thus, she only invokes Buddhism as a playful way to characterize Arthur in 
Middlemarch, but her implicit interest in Buddhist lore portends the substantial role that 
Buddhism will play in the ethical framework of her final novel:  Daniel Deronda. 
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 Eliot engages with Buddhism in Deronda most explicitly in chapter thirty-seven 
when Mirah compares Deronda to the Buddha:  “Mr. Hans said yesterday that you 
thought so much of others you hardly wanted anything for yourself.  He told us a 
wonderful story of Bouddha giving himself to the famished tigress to save her and her 
little ones from starving.  And he said you were like Bouddha.  That is what we all 
imagine of you” (Deronda 399).  Eliot draws her inspiration for this passage from a 
Buddhist legend in Eugene Burnouf’s Introduction to Indian Buddhism (1844): 
A young Brahman who has retired into the depths of a forest to give himself over, 
in the interest of living beings… gives his body as food to a starving tigress that 
just gave birth to cubs.  At the moment of committing this heroic sacrifice, he 
exclaims:  ‘How true it is that I do not abandon life for kingship, or for the 
enjoyments of pleasure, or for the rank of Sakra, or for that of sovereign monarch, 
but rather to reach the supreme state of a perfectly accomplished buddha.  
(Burnouf 185-186) 
The Brahman’s driving desire is not the political aspirations of an exclusive culture but 
rather the enactment of a universal compassion for all living things—a perfectly 
accomplished Buddha.  Mirah attributes these qualities of renunciation and compassion to 
Deronda, but Deronda rejects the analogy.  He contends that the Buddhist legend 
underestimates personal desire and that the myth “is like a passionate word… the 
exaggeration is a flash of fervor.  It is an extreme image of what is happening every 
day—the transmutation of self,” (Deronda 400).  Eliot’s decision to juxtapose the 
Buddha with Deronda suggests that Buddhism plays a crucial role in understanding the 
ethical message of Deronda, since Deronda participates in many of the major ethical 
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decisions in the novel.  His refusal to compare himself with the Buddha creates tension 
between the ethics of Deronda and Buddhism, and given the Buddha’s status as a 
supremely ethical man, Eliot’s decision to juxtapose the two figures most likely critiques 
Deronda’s compassion. 
This essay argues that Eliot uses the explicit Buddhist metaphor in chapter thirty-
seven of Deronda and the implicit Buddhism in Mordecai’s Kabbalism to denounce the 
exclusivist ethics of Jewish Nationalism.  Buddhism alleviates the tension between 
universal compassion, cosmopolitanism, and cultural heritage in Eliot’s vision of Jewish 
ethics by introducing renunciation as a technique to dissolve exclusivism while still 
cherishing cultural heritage.  For Eliot, genuine compassion derives from renouncing 
personal desires in favor of an inclusive compassion for those least similar to oneself:  
“There is nothing I should care more to do… than rouse the imagination of men and 
women to a vision of human claims in those races of their fellow-men who most differ 
from them in customs and beliefs” (GEL 6: 302).  An ethical person must remain, 
however, grounded in a specific cultural heritage and not succumb to a soulless 
cosmopolitanism.  Judaism offers a religion that cherishes cultural heritage, but the 
exclusivism of Mordecai in Deronda celebrates compassion for those most similar to 
oneself and thus precludes universal compassion.  Buddhism for Eliot, on the other hand, 
presents a religion that renounces egoistic desires and extends compassion to all cultures 
by avoiding the concept of God and transcending cultural boundaries.  Anyone may 
practice the universal compassion of Buddhism without sacrificing cultural heritage or 
encroaching upon the political autonomy of others. 
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This essay contends that Eliot presents Buddhism in Deronda not as a superior 
religion to Judaism but rather as a supplemental belief system to combat exclusivism and 
facilitate universal compassion.  Chapter one explores Judaism in Deronda in terms of 
the tension between cultural heritage and exclusivism.  It argues that Eliot endorses 
Judaism for its emphasis on cultural heritage, but she does not condone the exclusiveness 
of Mordecai and Deronda.  Eliot applauds the Jewish ability to retain a cultural identity 
amid the cosmopolitanism of Victorian England, but Deronda’s decision to abandon 
Gwendolen reflects for Eliot the dangers of a religious outlook that promotes exclusivism 
rather than universal compassion.  Chapter two chronicles Eliot’s progression into secular 
humanism, and it argues that Eliot chose Kabbalism as the paradigm for Judaism in 
Deronda because Kabbalism shares numerous affinities with Buddhism.  Many Victorian 
scholars familiar to Eliot credit the historical origins of the Kaballah to Buddhism.  
Finally, the conclusion asserts that contextualizing Judaism in Deronda in terms of 
Buddhist influence helps resolve some of the conflicts in the novel between exclusivism 
and universal compassion. 










Chapter II:  Judaism, Collective Memory, and Universal Compassion 
 
Eliot’s decision to feature Jewish characters in Daniel Deronda was not particularly bold.  
After all, many of her contemporaries, such as Trollope and Dickens, included Jewish 
characters.  But as Amanda Anderson observes in “George Eliot and the Jewish 
Question” (1997), Eliot was the first popular novelist to portray Jews as the norm rather 
than the marginalized minority (Anderson 44).  This reversal of cultural power mystified 
many of Eliot’s readers because her sympathy for Judaism in Deronda finds little 
precedent in any of her previous novels. In fact, Eliot seemed antagonistic toward Jews 
earlier in her life, as evinced by an 1848 letter to John Sibree: 
My Gentile nature kicks most resolutely against any assumption of superiority in 
the Jews…  Their stock has produced a Moses and a Jesus, but Moses was 
impregnated with Egyptian philosophy and Jesus is venerated and adored by us 
only for that wherein he transcended or resisted Judaism… Everything 
specifically Jewish is of a low grade.  (GEL 1: 246-247) 
Eliot’s letter to Mr. Sibree seems unequivocal in its contempt for Judaism, and yet 
twenty- eight years later in a letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe on October 29, 1876, Eliot 
seems to have completely reversed her position: 
Towards the Hebrews we Western people… have a peculiar debt.  Can there be 
anything more disgusting than to hear people called ‘educated’… showing 
themselves empty of any real knowledge as to the relation of their own social and 
religious life to the history of [Judaism]?  They hardly know Christ was a Jew.  
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And I find men educated at Rugby supposing that Christ spoke Greek.2  (GEL 6: 
302) 
Eliot never explained the reasons behind her transition from antagonism toward Jews in 
the Sibree letter to sympathy for Jews in Deronda.  In an 1870 letter to Frederick 
Harrison, however, Eliot reflects upon why she avoids making explicit statements 
regarding the Jews:  “I shrink from decided ‘deliverances’ on momentous subjects, from 
the dread of coming to swear by my own ‘deliverances’ and sinking into an insistent echo 
of myself.  That is a horrible destiny—and one cannot help seeing that many of the most 
powerful men fall into it” (GEL 5: 76).  Eliot’s aversion to “decided deliverances” and 
her subsequent condemnation of those who swear by their own deliverances introduces 
egoism as vice in her ethical paradigm.  To avoid egoistic deliverances about the Jews, 
Eliot defers to David Kaufmann and his work of criticism George Eliot and Judaism 
(1877) as “the perfect response to the artist’s intention” (GEL 6: 379).  Eliot in particular 
applauds Kaufmann’s “Clear perception of the relation between the presentation of the 
Jewish element and those of English Social life” (GEL 6: 379).  This relation between the 
Jews and the English gentiles mirrors the tension in Deronda between Deronda and 
Gwendolen, and thus, Kaufmann’s work offers a logical place to begin exploring 
compassion in terms of Eliot’s Judaism in Deronda. 
 In his criticism, Kaufmann describes the nineteenth century as a time of 
awakening for a collective Jewish spirit whose national consciousness will only find 









satisfaction in the re-establishment of Israel.  He recounts how the Jews lost their 
homeland to the Romans (Kaufmann 4), and he argues that centuries of Jewish dispersion 
eroded the “definite consciousness of national vocation” (9).  He asserts that a quest for 
“Universal Humanity” had dominated European intellectual conversations in the 
eighteenth century and that nationality did not reemerge as a popular idea until the French 
Revolution (Kaufmann 10-11).  He observes that many gentile Europeans in the early 
nineteenth century began to question the national allegiance of the Jews, who maintained 
a culture distinct from their host countries, and advancements in science and proto-
genetics spawned theories of European racial superiority (12).  This classification of the 
Jews by the gentiles as a separate nationality spurred the Jews to reflect on their own 
sense of national unity (13).  Kaufmann contends that this longing for unity reignited 
religious passion in many Jews and transformed Palestine from a geographical location 
into the soul of the Jewish people (16), and he asserts that the Jewish people will only 
find satisfaction by reclaiming Israel (16-20) 
Kaufmann commends several English writers for attempting to explore the 
complexities of Judaism, citing characters such as Shylock (Merchant of Venice), 
Rebecca (Ivanhoe), and Riah (Our Mutual Friend) (Kaufmann 21-22).  He reserves the 
greatest encomium, however, for George Eliot and Daniel Deronda.   Kaufmann praises 
Eliot for her poetic insight into Judaism, but he also adds that she “perceives with the 
prophetic eye of genius the proper moment [my emphasis] for answering the fundamental 
questions of Judaism” (20).  A crucial term in Kaufmann’s compliment is “moment.”  
Given that Kaufmann believes that his Jewish contemporaries are on the verge of re-
establishing Israel, Kaufmann’s attention to the “timing” of Daniel Deronda implies that 
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he perceives the novel to ally itself with Jewish Nationalism.  Kaufmann makes this 
inference most explicit when he claims: 
None but a poetess cunning to transform convictions into motives, and thoughts 
into actions would have ventured to animate her work with a sentiment so strange 
and even unintelligible to the majority of the cultivated as the longing of the Jews 
for the re-establishment of their kingdom.  (Kaufmann 26) 
Kaufmann views Mordecai as a prophet for the re-establishment of Israel (Kaufmann 56), 
despite Mordecai’s death at the end of the novel, but he also adds, “Remembering the 
Jewish day begins in the evening, [Eliot] has chosen to delay her hero’s sunrise, and has 
shown him to us first by the play of moonbeams” (Kaufmann 56).  Thus, for Kaufmann, 
Deronda becomes the herald for a new Israel once Mordecai dies, and Eliot endorses this 
political movement. 
 Kaufmann makes a compelling case that Eliot sympathizes with Jewish culture in 
Deronda, but his inferences regarding Eliot’s endorsement of the Jewish political 
movement to re-establish Israel contain several unrealistic assumptions.  First, Kaufmann 
asserts that European interest in the concept of “Universal Humanity” waned at the end of 
the eighteenth century (Kaufmann 10).  Nationalism did become popular in conjunction 
with early nineteenth-century theories of race, but several prominent thinkers whom Eliot 
revered (Arnold, Muller) still maintained the philosophical possibilities of a borderless, 
unified culture.  Also, Eliot in her letter to Kaufmann commends the relationship 
between the “Jewish element” and English social life (GEL 6:379).  Her juxtaposition of 
the Jews and the English in terms of a “relationship” suggests a common culture between 
the two groups rather than the innate separateness that Kaufmann’s rhetoric for 
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nationalism seems to imply.  In addition, Eliot mentions neither the re-establishment of 
Israel nor the political status of Jews in her letter to Kaufmann.  She focuses most of her 
letter upon cross-cultural compassion and sympathy:  “[Kaufmann’s essay] has affected 
me deeply, and though the prejudice and ignorant obtuseness which has met my effort to 
contribute something to the ennobling of Judaism in the conception of the Christian 
community and in the consciousness of the Jewish community, has never for a moment 
made me repent my choice” (379).  Eliot emphasizes a compassion for Jewish heritage 
that transcends traditional cultural boundaries.  Therefore, she has not “timed” her novel 
with a “prophetic eye” to endorse the political establishment of Israel but rather she 
seems to have written the novel to facilitate compassion between multiple cultures in a 
time of growing tension between the Europeans and the Jews. 
 Eliot undoubtedly valued both compassion and sympathy between cultures on an 
abstract level, but several critics have questioned whether she believed that such harmony 
between cultures was truly possible.  After all, Eliot’s past anti-Semitism suggests that 
her views about Judaism were fluid if not at times paradoxical.  Given these uncertainties 
regarding Eliot’s purpose in writing Deronda, some critics have asserted that scholars 
should look at what Eliot does not say in Deronda to find the limits of her compassion.  
They claim that Eliot’s omission of non-European cultures is indicative of a cultural bias 
perpetuated by her status as an affluent English woman.  Thus, they conclude that 
regardless of her conscious intent, Eliot and Deronda are the products of colonial 
ideology, and this ideology precludes genuine universal compassion. 
Edward Said spearheaded this ideological interpretation of Deronda in his famous 
1979 work of criticism, The Question of Palestine.  Similar to Kaufmann, Said interprets 
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Mordecai as a representative for Eliot’s actual beliefs regarding Zionism, but he also 
concedes that Mordecai’s mission to re-establish Israel in Deronda seems suspicious in 
the context of Eliot’s previous work: 
The unusual thing about [Deronda] is that its main subject is Zionism, although 
the novel’s principal themes are recognizable to anyone who has read Eliot’s 
earlier fiction… In her earlier books, Eliot had studied a variety of enthusiasms, 
all of them replacements for organized religion, all of them attractive to persons 
who would have been Saint Teresa had they lived during a period of coherent 
faith… [Deronda endeavors] toward a genuinely hopeful socioreligious project in 
which individual energies can be merged and identified with a collective national 
vision, the whole emanating out of Judaism.  (Said 60-61) 
The most important aspect of Said’s opening remarks about Deronda is his concession 
that Eliot strives to craft the ethics of her fiction around minimizing the individual ego in 
favor of a more universal compassion.  Said claims that in Deronda Eliot’s ethic of 
greater compassion arises from Jewish nationalism, but in Eliot’s earlier works, the 
foundation for compassion was an “enthusiasm” and not an organized religion. Thus, 
Said rightly becomes puzzled by what he perceives as Eliot’s ostensible endorsement of 
Zionism—a political movement exclusive to Jews that necessarily prohibits 
egalitarianism and relies upon God, rather than humankind, for ultimate Truth.  Said’s 
observation reaffirms that “Universal Humanity” was not an antiquated notion, as 
Kaufmann asserted, but rather a proxy for the Good in Victorian ethical systems that 
spurned “organized religion.”  In addition, as Said implies, secularity and universal 
compassion are two themes that resonate through much of Eliot’s previous fiction.  The 
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crucial question for Said hence becomes:  Why would Eliot endorse a political movement 
as controversial as Zionism to express her ideas of compassion? 
  Said theorizes that Eliot champions Zionism for its emphasis on cultural heritage.  
He identifies transience and alienation as two negative aspects of Victorian society that 
Eliot criticizes in Deronda: 
The crucial thing about the way Zionism is presented in the novel is that its 
backdrop is a generalized condition of homelessness.  Not only the Jews, but even 
the well-born Englishmen and women in the novel are portrayed as wandering 
and alienated beings… Thus Eliot uses the plight of the Jews to make a universal 
statement about the nineteenth-century’s need for a home, given the spiritual and 
psychological rootlessness reflected in her characters’ almost ontological physical 
restlessness.  (61-62) 
Said claims that the Jews maintain a unified culture better than any other people, despite 
the alienating atmosphere of nineteenth-century Europe (62).  Therefore, Eliot naturally 
would select Zionism as a mouthpiece to voice her own reservations about cultural 
lethargy in England.  This inference seems reasonable, given Eliot’s praise for Jewish 
culture in her letter to Kaufmann.  Mordecai’s mission to re-establish Israel in Deronda 
provides a spiritual home for the Jews against the rootless cosmopolitanism of Victorian 
England. 
There can be little doubt that Mordecai’s vision of a new Israel significantly 
improves the spiritual outlook for many Jews in Deronda.  Also, as Kaufmann noted, 
Eliot’s masterful depiction of the heart of Judaism implies that she sympathizes with the 
Jewish people.  But Eliot never equates sympathy with political action.  As her letter to 
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Kaufmann illustrates, she frames her sympathy for Judaism as a means for fostering 
cultural unity, not creating political boundaries.  Said, however, isolates a speech from 
Mordecai during the Hand and Banner section of Deronda to assert that Eliot endorses 
Zionism for its political ambitions: 
Let [the re-establishment of Israel] come to pass, and the living warmth will 
spread to the weak extremities of Israel, and superstition will vanish, not in the 
lawlessness of the renegade, but in the illumination of great facts which widen 
feeling, and make all knowledge alive as the young offspring of beloved 
memories.  (Deronda 454) 
Said claims that Mordecai’s phrase “in the illumination of great facts which widen 
feeling” typifies Eliot’s rhetoric, and he concludes that “[Eliot’s] approbation for her 
Zionists derives from her belief that they were a group almost exactly expressing her own 
grand ideas about an expanded life of feelings” (Said 63).  Therefore, Said accuses Eliot 
of appropriating Judaism to propagate European ideology.  Said notes that although Eliot 
markets Judaism as a tradition of the “East,” she never gives voice to any actual 
characters from the East.  All of the Jews in the novel are European (Said 63).  Said also 
isolates more quotes from Mordecai during the Hand and Banner scene that depict the 
West as saving the East from “debauched and paupered conquerors” and “despotisms” 
(Deronda 456).  Hence, the Zionist project is a means for the West to liberate the 
“despotic” East (Said 65).  Said claims that Eliot’s endorsement of Zionism is not a 
deviation from the Victorian intelligentsia but rather part of a greater European agenda to 
ally the Jews against the Palestinians (Said 66).  Said acknowledges that Eliot believes 
Zionism will increase sympathy between East and West, but her refusal to give voice to 
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characters from the East demonstrates that European ideology limits the capacity of her 
compassion (Said 65). 
 Said is correct in his observation that Eliot does not provide an adequate Arab 
voice in Deronda, but his argument that Eliot perpetuates a colonialist ideology finds 
little grounding in her actual thought.  In a letter to Harriet Beecher Stowe on October 29, 
1876, Eliot expresses her contempt for the imperialist agenda of Victorian England: 
Moreover, not only towards the Jews, but towards all oriental peoples with whom 
we English come in contact, a spirit of arrogance and contemptuous 
dictatorialness is observable which has become a national disgrace to us.  There is 
nothing I should care more to do… than rouse the imagination of men and women 
to a vision of human claims in those races of their fellow-men who most differ 
from them in customs and beliefs. (GEL 6: 302) 
Eliot’s letter to Stowe demonstrates her rejection of the colonialist ideology.  Eliot does 
not offer a voice to the Palestinians in Deronda, but in her letter to Stowe, Eliot extends 
her compassion to all oriental peoples, including the Palestinians.  Eliot expresses disdain 
for any ideology that precludes fellowship with other cultures, and she makes explicit her 
condemnation of exclusivism at the end of the same letter to Stowe:  “This inability to 
find interest in any form of life that is not clad in the same coat-tails and flounces as our 
own lies very close to the worst kind of irreligion” (GEL 6: 302).  Thus, Eliot’s letter 
shows a clear regard for other cultures and emphasizes multiculturalism in her notion of 
compassion. 
Nancy Henry in her book George Eliot and the British Empire (2002) further 
dismantles Said’s accusation that Eliot is an imperialist.  Henry acknowledges that indeed 
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many Europeans contemporaneous with Eliot, such as Moses Montefiore and Lawrence 
Oliphant, supported the ambition of many Jews to colonize Palestine (Henry 117), but 
when John Blackwood insinuated that Eliot would rejoice in the colonizing project of 
Oliphant (GEL 7: 192), Eliot remained silent.  For Said, Eliot’s silence in Deronda 
implies an imperialist agenda, but for Henry, Eliot’s silence regarding the Jewish 
movement to re-establish Israel implies political distance.  In addition, Henry suggests 
that Eliot’s silence about the “East” reflects her respect for foreign cultures.  Deronda 
does not include a post-script, unlike many of Eliot’s previous works, such as 
Middlemarch, and Henry theorizes that Eliot does not describe the completion of 
Deronda’s mission because such a description would speak from ignorance, since Eliot 
herself never ventured to the East (Henry 119).  Rex Gascoigne serves as a warning 
within Deronda itself of the dangers inherent in constructing ideas about other cultures 
without any actual experience of those cultures (119).  Rex believes Canada to be an 
empty wilderness in which he can rebuild a new life, but his conflation of different 
colonies highlights the ignorance of speaking without experience (Deronda 71).  
Similarly, Henry adds that Rex and his ignorance find analogy in Casaubon from 
Middlemarch (Henry 120).  Casaubon can never complete his “Key to All Mythologies” 
because he has little experience with foreign cultures to ground his scholarship.  Thus, 
Eliot’s refusal to depict the East in Deronda is not an unconscious product of colonial 
ideology but rather a deliberate gesture of respect for a culture with which Eliot has little 
experience. 
 Eliot seems to favor universal compassion in her letters and in some moments of 
Deronda, but nevertheless, both Kaufmann and Said acknowledge that Mordecai’s 
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mission to re-establish Israel challenges universal compassion.  Eliot graces Mordecai 
with the most poetic speeches and complex philosophy of any of the characters in the 
novel, but does the prominence of Mordecai imply that Eliot agrees with his agenda?  
The fictional nature of Deronda poses another formal challenge as well:  how can we 
differentiate between Eliot and Mordecai, since Eliot created Mordecai?  Eliot avoids 
“decided deliverances” about Jewish nationalism in her letters and essays, but as 
exemplified in Deronda, Eliot does encode traces of her ethics in her fictional characters.  
Henry implies in her critique of Said that we may find analogy for Eliot’s ethical 
paradigm in Deronda by examining Eliot’s contemporaneous works of fiction (Henry 
120).  For example, Rex Gascoigne’s parochial vision of Canadian colonies mimics 
Casaubon’s naïve “key to all mythologies.”  Thus, one useful way to analyze Eliot’s 
relationship with the Jewish ambition to re-establish Israel lies in juxtaposing the ideas of 
Mordecai with the ideas of Theophrastus in Eliot’s other substantial meditation on 
Judaism—“The Modern Hep! Hep! Hep!” from Eliot’s final work of fiction, Impressions 
of Theophrastus Such (1879). 
Eliot’s Impressions of Theophrastus Such presents a collection of interconnected 
meditations that critique various aspects of Victorian England.  The protagonist, 
Theophrastus, poses as an English bachelor and neutral commentator, but his ideas share 
a high degree of correlation with Eliot’s own convictions as expressed in her letters and 
essays.  Similarly, the expository voice of Theophrastus invites a more literal 
interpretation of his ideas than the eloquent metaphors of Mordecai in Deronda.  
Theophrastus does not speak directly on behalf of George Eliot, but his voice is closer to 
Eliot’s than any of the characters in Deronda. 
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 Theophrastus tells his impressions as an outsider who has been integrated into 
English society, but he does not profess an allegiance to any single culture, unlike 
Mordecai, who expresses an unabashed bias for Judaism.  Theophrastus seems to share 
the same rootlessness that afflicts many of Eliot’s characters in Deronda.  But if 
Theophrastus represents a voice of wisdom and if wisdom somehow involves cultural 
heritage, as Kaufmann and Said suggest, why would Eliot not ground Theophrastus in a 
single culture?  Theophrastus seems to speak for both the ancient Greek and Victorian 
Englishman.  His ostensible rootlessness could represent the cultural lethargy of 
Victorian England, but Eliot never provides any reason to read irony into the voice of 
Theophrastus.  The amorphous nature of Theophrastus must therefore reflect an 
important aspect of Eliot’s ethics.  Perhaps Theophrastus is not rootless but rather pliable 
in his cultural convictions.  This cultural mobility allows Theophrastus to assess his 
impressions without the ethnic bias of Mordecai or the ignorance of Rex Gascoigne.  
Theophrastus is able to express compassion for multiple cultures precisely because he 
does not bind himself to the “decided deliverances” of any single culture.  He minimizes 
his egoism by broadening his compassion.  Thus, Theophrastus adapts his cultural lens to 
judge each impression, and this mobility of conviction serves as the foundation for 
universal compassion George Eliot’s ethics. 
Theophrastus engages with universal compassion and Jewish nationalism most 
explicitly in his final impression:  “The Modern Hep! Hep! Hep!”.  In “Hep!”, 
Theophrastus appears to endorse the re-establishment of Israel with passages such as:  “I 
share the spirit of the Zealots.  I take the spectacle of the Jewish people… preferring 
death by starvation or sword… as a sublime type of steadfastness” (“Hep!” 150) and 
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“Every Jew should be conscious that he is one of a multitude… strong enough… to 
constitute a new beneficent individuality among the nations, and, by confuting the 
traditions of scorn [non-Jewish religions], nobly avenge the wrongs done to their Fathers” 
(“Hep!” 164).  In fact, Theophrastus establishes nationalism as the core of all ethics when 
he claims:  “The consciousness of having a native country… that sense of special 
belonging… is the root of human virtues, both public and private” (“Hep!” 156).  Thus, 
human virtue for Theophrastus seems to require a nationalism that excludes other 
cultures.  Theophrastus attests to this necessity of separateness when he compares 
cosmopolitanism to cynicism:  “If [the Jews] drop that separateness which is made their 
reproach, they may be in danger of lapsing into a cosmopolitan indifference equivalent to 
cynicism, and of missing that inward identification with nationality… which might make 
some amends for their inherited privation” (“Hep!” 155).  Cosmopolitanism for 
Theophrastus therefore nullifies the solidarity necessary for an ethical society and instead 
teaches a superstition that disregards the cultural history crucial for human identity 
(“Hep!” 165). 
Theophrastus’ celebration of nationalism in “Hep!” seems to contradict Eliot’s 
endorsement of universal compassion.  If the human Good derives from a cultural history 
distinct to a particular people, then an ethical person must necessarily exclude other 
cultures to avoid “cosmopolitan indifference.”  But although Theophrastus describes 
nationalism as an exclusive cultural heritage shared by a particular group of people, he 
also asserts that the greatest Good transcends these particularities of nationality: 
Affection, intelligence, duty, radiate from a centre, and nature has decided that for 
us English folk that centre can be neither China nor Peru.  Most of us feel this 
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way unreflectingly… what is wanting is, that we should recognize a 
corresponding attachment to nationality as legitimate in every other people, and 
understand that its absence is a privation of the greatest good. (“Hep!” 147) 
Thus, nationalism for Theophrastus does not presume a political nation at all but rather 
describes a unified culture, which, in the case of the Jews, overcomes national 
boundaries:  “A people with oriental sunlight in their blood, yet capable of being 
everywhere acclimatized, [Jews] have a force and toughness which enables them to carry 
off the best prizes” (“Hep!” 157).  A “nation” for Theophrastus is not a geographical 
location but rather a national consciousness among a group of people despite cultural 
differences.  Therefore, political cosmopolitanism is the tragic loss of identity with this 
national consciousness, but universal compassion is the ability for compassion to 
transcend one’s own culture and “rouse imagination for those whose customs differ most 
from our own.”  The Jews for Theophrastus are capable of balancing national 
consciousness and universal compassion by acclimatizing with other cultures while still 
maintaining their own “oriental sunlight.”  But the ethical consequences of national 
consciousness and universal compassion extend beyond the Jews.  Eliot’s choice of the 
phrasing “oriental sunlight” rather than “Jewish sunlight” also implies that Eliot believes 
other Asian belief systems, such as Buddhism, may share the same affinity for universal 
compassion. 
 Henry reflects upon this idea of nationalism as a consciousness in George Eliot 
and the British Empire.  She asserts that Eliot with “Hep!” builds on the notion of 
collective memory that she began in Deronda, but in contrast to Said, Henry argues that 
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Eliot rejects imperialism by supporting a form of Judaism that redefines traditional 
political boundaries: 
Just as she began to do in Deronda, in Impressions Eliot shows a state of 
continuity between past and present that makes possible new categories and 
identities for individuals and communities:  the Jews are urged to form a modern 
nationality based on the memories of their collective history; the English are 
urged to scrutinize and remake their national character by recognizing a history of 
colonization, aggressive greed, and complacent superiority.  In Impressions, we 
begin to see a critical awareness on Eliot’s part of what might today be called 
“imperialist ideology”.  (Henry 129) 
As we have seen in Eliot’s letters and in the comments of her critics, Eliot extends her 
compassion beyond the cultural borders of English society.  Henry theorizes that Eliot 
finds in Judaism the blueprint for a “modern nationality” where collective memory rather 
than political boundaries unifies a culture.  Eliot anticipates and challenges Said’s notion 
of political sovereignty in “Hep!” by depicting England as a country conquered and 
colonized by various cultures throughout history.  By creating an analogue between the 
Jews and the English, Eliot illustrates that “sovereignty” is not a set of political 
boundaries but rather a perception of cultural cohesion. 
Henry further proposes that Said’s notion of sovereignty is ironically a product of 
Western ideology (Henry 118), and thus, Eliot’s concept of a national consciousness 
without borders may be more congruent with the actual political atmosphere of the 
Middle East during the Victorian era.  Henry observes that despite Said’s descriptions of 
the West as insular, many Europeans gained an awareness of Middle Eastern culture 
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through colonial and travel literature (Henry 118).  The majority of these accounts 
portray the Middle East as a hostile and inequitable place.  C. W. M. van de Velde 
captures this pervasive theme of suffering in European literature about the Middle East in 
his book Syria and Palestine in 1851 and 1852:  “Not a book do we find written upon 
Palestine that does not lament over the violence of its oppressors!”  (Henry 118).  Given 
the ubiquity of these accounts, Henry asserts that Eliot viewed the Turkish Empire as an 
imperialist regime that oppressed the indigenous cultures of the region (Judaism) in much 
the same way that the English subjugated their colonies (118).  Thus, Henry proposes that 
Deronda’s quest is not an imperial project of domination but rather a compassionate quest 
to bring cultural cohesion and spiritual reprieve to an oppressed population (118). 
Eliot seems to sympathize with Judaism in both Deronda and Impressions, and 
her sympathy most likely stems from a desire to spread compassion for a suffering people 
rather than to promote an imperialist agenda.  We have noticed, however, that every critic 
thus far has attributed to Mordecai the imperial re-establishment of Israel and that 
Mordecai’s ideas receive more development in the novel than any other philosophy.  
Nevertheless, Bryan Cheyette in Constructions of ‘the Jew’ in English Literature and 
Society (1993) argues that Mordecai does not represent the totality of Judaism in 
Deronda.  Cheyette notes that Eliot does not portray all Jews in Deronda with the same 
benevolence as Mordecai: 
While Mordecai’s Jewish nationalism expresses a timeless ‘reconciliation’ of 
‘East and West’, it also emphasizes the particularist need for the transfiguration of 
materialist Jews in the here and now… Throughout the novel Daniel (as well as 
Mrs. Meyrick, Hans, the Arrowpoints and Gwendolen) continually note the 
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‘ugly’, ‘vulgar’, ‘narrow’, ‘unpoetic’ or ‘unrefined’ nature of Jews and Judaism.  
(Cheyette 47) 
Thus, Judaism is not a homogenous culture in Deronda but rather a complex set of ideas 
with conflicting representations and valuations by Eliot.  As we have seen, Kaufmann 
and Mordecai believe that Jews must maintain a separate identity from the gentiles, and 
they should re-establish Israel as a means to guarantee their cultural solidarity.  On the 
other hand, Eliot distances herself from imperialist movements and expresses disdain for 
any culture that aspires toward “a spirit of arrogance and contemptuous dictatorialness.”  
Thus, Mordecai remains the ostensible mouthpiece for Judaism during an initial reading 
of Deronda, but a closer examination reveals that Eliot includes many Jewish voices that 
complicate the dominance of Mordecai. 
 The most direct confrontation between Mordecai and other voices of Judaism in 
Deronda occurs in the Hand and Banner scene of chapter forty-two.  During this scene, 
Mordecai and Gideon debate the merits of Jewish nationalism.  Gideon begins the 
discussion by suggesting that Jews should revere their heritage while assimilating into 
gentile communities: 
I’m a rational Jew myself.  I stand by my people as a sort of family relations, and 
I am for keeping up our worship in a rational way… But I am for getting rid of all 
our superstitions and exclusiveness.  There’s no reason now why we shouldn’t 
melt gradually into the populations we live among.  That’s the order of the day in 
point of progress… And I’m for the old maxim, ‘A man’s country is where he’s 
well off.’ (Deronda 449-450) 
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Gideon’s opening contains many of the ideas that Eliot champions in her letters and 
“Hep!”.  He endorses collective memory as a vehicle for fostering cultural cohesion 
without limiting compassion through exclusivism.  This mirrors Eliot’s desire to combat 
cosmopolitanism without compromising universal compassion.  Gideon also explicitly 
states that he wishes to cleanse Judaism of its exclusivist boundaries (superstitions), and 
he defines this universalizing process as a hallmark of human progress.  Therefore, 
Gideon reflects Eliot’s ambition to foster an inclusive idea of nationality that allows 
every culture to celebrate its distinct heritage while “gradually melting” into other 
cultures.  Eliot agrees with Gideon’s acceptance of assimilation in her essay “Hep!”: 
The tendency of things is towards the quicker or slower fusion of the races.  It is 
impossible to arrest this tendency:  all we can do is to moderate its course so as to 
hinder it from degrading the moral status of societies by a too rapid effacement of 
those national traditions and customs which are the language of the national 
genius—the deep suckers of healthy sentiment.  Such moderating and guidance of 
inevitable movement is worthy of all effort.  And it is in this sense that the 
modern insistence on the idea of Nationalities has value.  (Impressions 160) 
For Theophrastus (and probably Eliot), nationality only has value as a moderating force 
against the alienating effects of cosmopolitanism.  Nationalism is not a solution to the 
Victorian reality of increasing cultural exchanges between England and its trading 
partners.  Thus, for Eliot nationalism should not be a political means to ossify the 
exclusivist qualities of a culture but rather it should serve as a stabilizing mechanism to 
help preserve cultural value in the wake of rapid social changes. 
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 Bryan Cheyette, however, argues that Gideon’s version of Judaism departs from 
Eliot’s overall message in Deronda.  Cheyette claims that the main plot of Deronda 
represents a form of Disraelian romanticism in which Deronda must find the hidden 
tokens of his birth to achieve fulfillment (Cheyette 46).  The personal nature of this quest 
defines Judaism against rational discourse and instead invokes mystical apprehension as 
the font of true knowledge.  Cheyette cites Mordecai’s response to Gideon in the Hand 
and Banner scene as evidence that mysticism coalesces well with Eliot’s ethical agenda 
in Deronda (Cheyette 46): 
[Mordecai] too is a rational Jew.  But what is it to be rational—what is it to feel 
the light of the divine reason growing stronger within and without?  It is to see 
more and more of the hidden bonds that bind and consecrate change as a 
dependent growth—yea, consecrate it with kinship:  the past becomes my parent, 
and the future stretches toward me the appealing arms of children.  (Deronda 451) 
Mordecai’s vision of rationality as a “change” consecrated by the bonds of kinship indeed 
matches Eliot’s interest in preserving culture in the face of growing cosmopolitan 
indifference, but on the surface, Mordecai’s vision seems interchangeable with Gideon’s 
notion of Judaism as a family bond rather than series of “superstitions.”  Both characters 
value collective memory and what appears to be universal compassion.  Mordecai, 
however, insists on exclusivism as a necessary quality of true Judaism, despite the 
illusion of universal compassion that he sometimes offers: 
When it is rational to say, “I know not my father or my mother, let my children be 
aliens to me, let no prayer of mine touch them,” then it will be rational for the Jew 
to say, “I will seek to know no difference between me and the Gentile, I will not 
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cherish the prophetic consciousness of our nationality—let the Hebrew cease to 
be, and let all his memorials be antiquarian trifles, dead wall-paintings of a 
conjectured race.”3  (Deronda 451) 
Thus for Mordecai, cultural exchange between Jews and Gentiles becomes tantamount to 
the obliteration of Jewish national consciousness. 
In the above quote, Mordecai also identifies race as a distinguishing quality of 
Jewish culture, and therefore any “filtering of the blood,” as Gideon proposes (Deronda 
451), necessarily corrupts Jewish culture.  Mordecai’s emphasis on racial purity is 
distinct from Eliot’s idea of an inclusive national consciousness, and it snuffs the 
possibility for universal compassion.  Eliot’s ethic of national consciousness fosters 
cultural exchange by transcending political boundaries, but Mordecai’s racialized 
discourse necessarily confines genuine compassion to an exclusive clan.4  Bryan Cheyette 
argues that this racialized hoarding of compassion reflects Eliot’s disavowal of “liberal 
progress”: 
In rejecting the false universalism of a materialist rationalism—the “promised 
land” of liberal progress—Eliot constructs a spiritual Judeo-centric universalism 
which is “beyond the liberal imagination”.  By associating a mystical 
transcendence with Jewish particularity, Eliot introduces a double narrative into 
her novel which both attempts to reach “beyond the modes of self-transcendence 
available in England at the time” and is, at the same time, confined by a racialized 








discourse.  This split between cultural transcendence and racial fixity is at the 
heart of Daniel Deronda.  (Cheyette 47) 
Eliot in Deronda and Impressions critiques the alienation and cosmopolitan indifference 
afflicting Victorian England as a result of excessive rationality, but she also champions a 
form of cultural cohesion that extends compassion beyond the boundaries (race) of any 
given culture.  Although Mordecai undoubtedly professes a vision of Judaism that is 
antithetical to Victorian “liberal progress,” anti-progressive narratives of racial 
determinism remain inconsistent with Eliot’s ethic of cultural exchange and universal 
compassion.  Nevertheless, Mordecai does receive more substantial philosophical 
treatment by Eliot than other characters in the novel, and Gideon seems to serve more as 
a catalyst for advancing Mordecai’s argument than a legitimate interlocutor.  As Cheyette 
notes, these seemingly conflicting representations create a paradoxical double narrative:  
Mordecai and his notion of racial determinism versus marginalized Jewish voices of 
assimilation and universal compassion.  If Eliot truly champions nationality as an 
inclusive collective memory capable of extending compassion toward numerous cultures, 
why would she craft Deronda around Mordecai’s narrative of exclusivism rather than 
Gideon’s notion of inclusive assimilation? 
Amanda Anderson argues that Deronda, not Mordecai, represents Eliot’s true 
ethical agenda in Deronda.  Kaufmann, Said, and Cheyette all assume that Mordecai and 
Deronda share a common vision of Judaism, but Anderson identifies the two characters 
as harboring distinct versions Judaism.  Anderson claims that Mordecai represents a 




For Mordecai, becoming self-conscious as a Jew means simply recognizing an 
identity that is fully underwritten by the bounds of the past and fully determined 
by a scenario of future nationalistic self-actualization… Thus, although both 
Deronda and Mordecai employ the term choice, their uses are dissimilar.  For 
Mordecai, choice is the unified collective acceptance and enactment of racial 
destiny.  (Anderson 48) 
Anderson therefore joins Cheyette in asserting that Mordecai emphasizes a brand of 
Judaism exclusive to a particular race, but her concept of choice creates a distinction 
between Deronda and Mordecai.  For Mordecai, choice is not an exercise in free will but 
rather a recognition that a larger purpose shapes individual choice into a determined, 
divine duty (Anderson 41).  Mordecai makes explicit this notion of choice as duty during 
his Hand and Banner debate with Gideon: 
I say that the strongest principle of growth lies in human choice.  The sons of 
Judah have to choose that God may again choose them.  The Messianic time is the 
time when Israel shall will the planting of the national ensign.  The Nile 
overflowed and rushed onward:  the Egyptian could not choose the overflow, but 
he chose to work and make channels for the fructifying waters, and Egypt became 
the land of corn.  Shall man, whose soul is set in the royalty of discernment and 
resolve deny his rank and say, I am an onlooker, ask no choice or purpose of me?  
That is the blasphemy of this time.  The divine principle of our race is action, 
choice, resolved memory.  (Deronda 459) 
Mordecai does assert the racial destiny that Anderson notes, but he also introduces 
“resolved memory” as an eschatological concept.  Collective memory for Mordecai is not 
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just a stabilizing mechanism for a people to stem the cultural erosion of cosmopolitanism:  
memory becomes a divine teleology for heralding the apocalypse.  Only the Jews have 
the choice to follow Divine Will, and Israel will only become a political presence during 
“Messianic time”—the end of the world.  Mordecai appears egalitarian at the end of his 
speech by claiming the new Jewish nation will “carry into it a new brotherhood with the 
nations of the Gentiles” (Deronda 459), but the Gentiles are not able to participate in 
God’s purpose.  Thus, “choice” for Mordecai creates cultural boundaries between Jews 
and Gentiles and undermines the universal compassion that Eliot champions in her notion 
of collective memory. 
Anderson recognizes the difficulty in reconciling Eliot’s ethics with the 
exclusivism of Mordecai, but she insists that Deronda departs from Mordecai and 
champions a more inclusive version of Judaism.  Anderson asserts that for Deronda, 
“choice” is a rational instrument for individuals to negotiate complex cultural 
interactions.  Deronda thus distances himself from the deterministic mysticism of 
Mordecai and instead models his approach to Jewish nationalism on the principles of 
democratic debate (Anderson 41).  Anderson cites the moment when Deronda informs 
Mordecai of his Jewish heritage as evidence of Deronda’s rational distance (Anderson 
49): 
‘It has begun already—the marriage of our souls.  It waits but the passing away of 
this body, and then they who are betrothed shall unite in a stricter bond, and what 
is mine shall be thine.  Call nothing mine that I have written, Daniel… For I have 
judged what I have written, and I desire the body that I gave my thought to pass 
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away as this fleshly body will pass; but let the thought be born again from the 
fuller soul which shall be called yours.’ 
‘You must not ask me to promise that,’ said Deronda, smiling.  ‘I must be 
convinced first of special reasons for it in the writings themselves.  And I am too 
backward a pupil yet.  That blent transmission must go on without any choice of 
ours; but what we can’t hinder must not make our rule for what we ought to 
choose.’  (Deronda 643) 
Anderson also marks Deronda’s encounter with Kalonymos as further evidence of his 
independent, rational approach to Judaism (Anderson 47): 
‘I shall call myself a Jew,’ said Deronda, deliberately becoming slightly paler 
under the piercing eyes of his questioner.  ‘But I will not say that I shall profess to 
believe exactly as my fathers have believed.  Our fathers themselves changed the 
horizon of their belief and learned of other races.  But I think I can maintain my 
grandfather’s notion of separateness with communication.  I hold that my first 
duty is to my own people, and if there is anything to be done toward restoring or 
perfecting their common life, I shall make that my vocation.’  (Deronda 620) 
As Anderson observes, Deronda distances himself somewhat from Mordecai and 
Kalonymos, but in neither case does he debate their exclusivism.  In the above passage, 
Deronda at first hints that he will “change the horizon” of his beliefs in accordance with 
the wisdom of other races, but the piercing gaze of Kalonymos coerces Deronda into 
asserting the supremacy of the Jews.  Similarly, Deronda smiles as he tells Mordecai that 
he will not follow him without rational investigation.  This smile betrays that Deronda’s 
hesitation is a mere formality.  He will not defy Mordecai.  Thus, no “democratic debate” 
 
 31 
occurs.  Deronda may at times appear to reflect upon the consequences of the exclusivist 
vision of Judaism endorsed by Mordecai and Kalonymos, but Daniel never debates 
Mordecai with the same sincerity as Gideon.  Deronda’s reservations derive from his own 
inward struggle against exclusivism and its inherent constriction of compassion, but 
ultimately, Deronda adopts Mordecai’s quest to reestablish Israel. 
Anderson admits that Deronda obeys Mordecai and seeks to reestablish Israel, but 
she insists that Deronda’s quest “will be enacted through an open-ended process of 
argumentation” (Anderson 48).  Anderson cites the end of chapter sixty-nine as evidence 
of Deronda’s inclusive approach to Judaism: 
I am going to the East to become better acquainted with the condition of my race 
in various countries there… The idea that I am possessed with is that of restoring 
a political existence to my people, making them a nation again, giving them a 
national centre, such as the English have… That is a task which presents itself to 
me as a duty:  I am resolved to begin it, however feebly… At the least, I may 
awaken a movement in other minds, such as has been awakened in my own.  
(Deronda 688) 
Anderson interprets Deronda’s desire to awaken a movement in the minds of others as a 
democratic dialog between Judaism and other cultures (Anderson 48), but the prospects 
for Daniel’s mission become ominous when Eliot describes the impact on Gwendolen of 
Deronda’s decision to move East: 
The world seemed getting larger round poor Gwendolen, and she the more 
solitary and helpless in the midst… There comes a terrible moment to many souls 
when the great movements of the world, the larger destinies of mankind, which 
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have lain aloof in newspapers and other neglected reading, enter like an 
earthquake into their own lives—when the slow urgency of growing generations 
turns into the tread of an invading army or the dire clash of civil war, and grey 
fathers know nothing to seek for but the corpses of their blooming sons, and girls 
forget all vanity to make lint and bandages which may serve for the shattered 
limbs of their betrothed husbands.  Then it is as if the Invisible Power that has 
been the object of lip-worship and lip-resignation became visible, according to the 
imagery of the Hebrew poet, making the flames his chariot and riding on the 
wings of the wind, till the mountains smoke and the plains shudder under the 
rolling, fiery visitation.  Often the good cause seems to lie prostrate under the 
thunder of unrelenting force, the martyrs live reviled, they die, and no angel is 
seen holding forth the crown and the palm branch.  Then it is that the submission 
of the soul to the Highest is tested, and even in the eyes of frivolity life looks out 
from the scene of human struggle with the awful face of duty, and a religion 
shows itself which is something else than a private consolation.  (Deronda 689) 
Many critics interpret the latter passage as a critique by Eliot of Gwendolen’s solipsism.  
Kaufmann asserts that Deronda serves as a guiding star to Gwendolen’s “harmless form 
of Egoism” (Kaufmann 60), and Anderson describes Gwendolen as an inconsequential 
spectator to Deronda’s great movement (Anderson 48).  Henry, however, best captures 
the interpretation of the latter passage as an indictment of Gwendolen: 
Gwendolen’s awakening is likened to the violence of invasion, civil war, and 
social crisis that calls for sacrifice and an elevation above self.  Deronda is not 
going to war, but his new-found connection to the “larger destinies of mankind” 
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makes him as remote to Gwendolen as the civil war in America or life in “the 
colonies.”  (Henry 137) 
Thus, Henry’s reading of the passage argues that Gwendolen becomes awestruck by 
Deronda’s quest to re-establish Israel, and the violent imagery is simply a metaphor for 
the shattering of her egoistic delusions.  This interpretation finds additional justification 
in the paragraph proceeding Gwendolen’s vision: 
That was the sort of crisis which was at this moment beginning in Gwendolen’s 
small life:  she was for the first time being dislodged from her supremacy in her 
own world, and getting a sense that her horizon was but a dipping onward of an 
existence with which her own was revolving… But here had come a shock which 
went deeper than personal jealousy—something spiritual and vaguely tremendous 
that thrust her away, and yet quelled all anger into self-humiliation.  (Deronda 
689) 
Thus, as Henry notes, Gwendolen’s vision does force her to re-evaluate her own 
solipsism, but Gwendolen never assents to this process.  There is no democratic debate, 
as Anderson suggests.  Gwendolen is “dislodged” from her worldview, and “something 
spiritual and vaguely tremendous” thrusts her away from Deronda and “quells” her 
resistance.  This imagery of violence and domination in both Gwendolen’s vision and the 
subsequent paragraph invoke the imperialism that George Eliot abhors.  Furthermore, 
Eliot states during Gwendolen’s vision that “many souls” suffer when larger destinies 
“enter like an earthquake into their lives.”  Eliot is not making a simple statement about 
Gwendolen’s egoism but rather she uses Gwendolen during the “terrible moment” 
passage as a proxy for the greater dangers inherent in the blending of politics with 
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religion.  Daniel’s quest for a Jewish homeland transforms Judaism from a unifying, 
collective memory into an apocalyptic force in which even the “martyrs live reviled” and 
“no angel is seen holding forth the crown and the palm branch.”  There is no victor in the 
religious campaign of Deronda.  Everyone suffers from the “awful face of duty,” and 
indeed “religion shows itself which is something else than a private consolation”:  it 
shows itself as the antithesis to the universal compassion that Eliot champions. 
 We find precedent for the apocalyptic vision of Gwendolen during the Hand and 
Banner scene.  Eliot leaves a subtle hint of the dire implications of Jewish nationalism 
when Mordecai proclaims his vision of a new Israel: 
I say the effect of our separateness will not be completed and have its highest 
transformation unless our race takes on again the character of a nationality… 
What is it to me that the ten tribes are lost untraceably, or that the multitudes of 
the children of Judah have mixed themselves with the Gentile populations as a 
river with rivers?  Behold our people still!  Their skirts spread afar; they are torn 
and soiled and trodden on; but there is a jewelled breastplate [my emphasis]… let 
them say, ‘we will lift up a standard, we will unite in a labor hard but glorious like 
that of Moses and Ezra.’  (Deronda 456) 
Both the “standard” and “breastplate” are images of war, and both Moses and Ezra led 
violent campaigns to assert the political will of the Jews; but the most revealing detail of 
this description is the “jeweled” breastplate.5  Eliot throughout Deronda associates jewels 





with greed and domination, and perhaps the greatest manifestation of this motif occurs 
when Gwendolen refuses to wear the diamonds of Lady Glasher:   
‘Oblige me by telling me your reason for not wearing the diamonds when I desire 
it,’ said Grandcourt.  His eyes were still fixed upon her, and she felt her own eyes 
narrowing under them as if to shut out an entering pain… 
‘He delights in making dogs and horses quail:  that is half his pleasure in calling 
them his,’ she said to herself… ‘It will come to be so with me; and I shall quail.  
What else is there for me?’ (Deronda 366) 
The “narrowing” of Gwendolen under the oppression of Grandcourt mirrors Gwendolen’s 
reduction to a mere speck during her apocalyptic vision (Deronda 689).  Deronda of 
course does not subjugate Gwendolen as Grandcourt does, but Deronda is not the cause 
of Gwendolen’s “terrible moment”; the cause of her suffering is “something spiritual and 
vaguely tremendous that thrust her away [from Deronda]” (Deronda 689).  Both Deronda 
and Gwendolen are therefore oppressed by these “greater destinies of mankind,” and both 
share similar ignominies:  Gwendolen wears Grandcourt’s diamond necklace as a symbol 
of her trespasses against Glasher, and Deronda bears Mordecai’s jeweled breastplate as a 
mark of the suffering he will cause during his quest for a new Israel.  Thus, the “terrible 
moment” scene is not just an indictment of Gwendolen’s solipsism but rather the scene is 
a meditation on the dangers inherent in a worldview where exclusivist ambitions subsume 
universal compassion. 
 Eliot commends Judaism for its emphasis on cultural cohesion through collective 
memory, but as Cheyette observes, Eliot does not treat all Jewish ideas and characters in 
the novel with equality.  The ideas of Mordecai receive the most philosophical 
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development, but Eliot provides numerous voices of dissent that highlight the tension 
between cultural heritage and universal compassion.  The “terrible moment” scene paints 
a dire outcome for the campaign of Deronda, but Eliot does not present an alternate 
Jewish narrative to compensate for the dearth of universal compassion inherent in 
exclusivity of Jewish nationalism.  She does, however, hint that Buddhist renunciation of 
the ego may supplement Judaism to create an ethical system that fosters both cultural 



















Chapter III:  Kaballah, Renunciation, and Buddhism 
 
The relationship between George Eliot and religion has always been a contested field of 
research.  Some scholars, such as Edward Said, claim that Eliot substituted various 
theories of Humanism for religion, but others, such as Peter Hodgson, argue that Eliot 
retained a highly nuanced system of spirituality throughout her life.6  Regardless of 
Eliot’s personal religiosity, religion undoubtedly plays a prominent role in the ethical 
systems of her novels, particularly Deronda, since Judaism serves as the catalyst for 
much of the character development and plot.  Thus, for a rigorous understanding of the 
ethical relationship between Jewish nationalism and universal compassion in Deronda, 
this chapter will explore Eliot’s estrangement from Christianity and then examine why 
she chooses Jewish Kabbalism to form the theology of Daniel Deronda. 
 Avrom Fleishman traces Eliot’s disillusionment with Evangelical Christianity in 
George Eliot’s Intellectual Life (2010).  Fleishman asserts that Eliot was a devout 
Evangelical for the first twenty-two years of her life, and he notes that during this period 
Eliot was particularly austere (Fleishman 13).  During this phase, Eliot often denigrated 
plays, novels, and any other form of entertainment that diverted attention away from God 
and toward the secular (Fleishman 15).  Fleishman argues, however, that Eliot betrayed 
subtle signs of dissent even during this evangelical period.  He contends that the most 
revealing of Eliot’s doubts was her lack of a personal relationship with God: 





But there would be some significance in her omitting certain important Christian 
convictions in these sustained and repeated testaments of faith… The most 
obvious omission is the doctrine of the atonement and its related doctrine of 
justification by faith… We may tentatively conclude that Christianity was not for 
the young believer a salvational or redemptive religion and that the figures of the 
Gospel narrative generated no intense personal love.  (Fleishman 16) 
Fleishman identifies an important aspect of Eliot’s theology that will persist throughout 
her life and her fiction, including Deronda:  God is distant from humanity.  Most of 
Eliot’s contemporary evangelicals established a personal relationship with God as a 
foundation of their religiosity, but for Eliot, humanity struggled through suffering with 
little reprieve from God.  This skepticism during Eliot’s evangelical years about the 
participation of God in human affairs laid the groundwork for her eventual departure 
from Evangelism and subsequent adoption of secular humanism. 
Fleishman claims that Eliot began her transition to humanism in earnest in 1841 
when she moved to Coventry and visited the family of Charles Bray (Fleishman 24).  
Eliot writes of the experience in an 1841 letter to Maria Lewis:  “My whole soul has been 
engrossed in the most interesting of all enquiries for the last few days, and to what result 
my thoughts may lead I know not—possibly to one that will startle you, but my only 
desire is to know the truth, my only fear to cling to error” (GEL 1: 120-21).  Fleishman 
speculates that the Bray family probably exposed Eliot to Unitarianism, phrenology, and 
rationalistic determinism, but the most influential text that Eliot read during the Bray visit 
was Charles Hennell’s An Inquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity (1838).  
Fleishman explains that Inquiry was a particularly important text for Eliot because it was 
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the first major work by an English author to perform the methods of Higher Criticism to 
the Bible (Fleishman 24).  Eliot’s exposure to Higher Criticism transformed the Bible 
from the infallible word of God into a historical collection of texts written by men.  The 
emphasis of Higher Criticism on the human construction of the Bible redirected for Eliot 
the ethical power of Christianity away from God and toward humanity.  Eliot explains 
her new outlook on Christianity to her father in an 1842 letter: 
I regard [Christian and Jewish] writings as histories consisting of mingled truth 
and fiction, and while I admire and cherish much of what I believe to have been 
the moral teaching of Jesus himself, I consider the system of doctrines built upon 
the facts of his life and drawn as to its materials from Jewish notions to be most 
dishonourable to God and most pernicious in its influence on individual and social 
happiness.  (GEL 1: 128) 
Eliot’s letter to her father revealed that by 1842 she had progressed from doubts about the 
Evangelical Church to animosity toward organized religion in general.  For Eliot, God 
was no longer simply a distant ideal of perfection; God was a mystical set of moral 
teachings that the institution of the Church had exploited to perpetuate injustice. 
Eliot best articulated her newfound hostility toward organized religion in a 
Westminster Review article entitled “Evangelical Teaching:  Dr. Cumming” (1855).  
Eliot opens her essay with sarcastic praise for Cumming by applauding his rhetorical 
skills and his theological dexterity in preaching only Biblical teachings convenient to his 
own interests.  She especially rebukes Cumming’s distinction between morality and 
intellect.  For Eliot, morality must derive from the intellect and not from emotion: 
 
 40 
There is not a more pernicious fallacy afloat in common parlance, than the wide 
distinction made between intellect and morality.  Amiable impulses without 
intellect, man may have in common with dogs and horses... All human beings 
who can be said to be in any degree moral have their impulses guided… In 
accordance with this we think it is found that, in proportion as religious sects exalt 
feeling above intellect… their sense of truthfulness is misty and confused.  
(“Evangelical” 144-45) 
Eliot’s idea of a morality congruent with the intellect parallels her earlier disparagement 
of personal relationships with God.  Meaningful religious ethics derive from the 
teachings of God, not faith in God.  This aversion to evangelism explains why Eliot 
admires much of the Jewish culture in Deronda.  Judaism offers a strong a sense of 
cultural heritage to combat Victorian rootlessness, and in addition, the Judaisms in 
Deronda also diminish the importance of a personal God and instead stress the teachings 
of Hebrew Scriptures as a guide for the Jews.  Furthermore, Judaism does not often 
proselytize, and thus, unlike evangelical Christianity, the basic theology of Judaism does 
not encroach on the beliefs of others.  
Despite this potential for Judaism to avoid proselytization, Mordecai in Deronda 
seeks to re-establish Israel, and his mission necessarily encroaches on the lives of the 
non-Jewish inhabitants of the Near East with an imperialist resolve that is antithetical 
George Eliot’s ethic of universal compassion.  Mordecai at times gestures toward 
harmony with the gentiles, but he never invites the gentiles to participate in his vision.  In 
“Evangelical,” Eliot describes any exclusivist expression of religion as a “clan” 
mentality, and she argues that clan religions cannot express genuine compassion: 
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This leads us to mention another conspicuous characteristic of Dr. Cumming’s 
teaching—the absence of genuine charity [Eliot’s emphasis].  It is true that he 
makes large profession of tolerance and liberality within a certain circle… But the 
love thus taught is the love of the clan [her emphasis], which is the correlative of 
antagonism to the rest of mankind.  (“Evangelical” 159) 
Thus, the love of the clan in “Evangelical” mirrors the Jewish exclusivism of Mordecai 
and Deronda in Deronda, and this exclusivism is not compatible with Eliot’s ethic of 
universal compassion. 
 Eliot’s decision to center Deronda upon Judaism therefore appears paradoxical.  
If Eliot values universal compassion, why would she choose to write about a religion that 
often celebrates its separateness from other cultures, and if Eliot prizes human ethics over 
divine dispensation, why would she choose a religion with such a strong theological 
grounding in the commands of God?  Eliot provides too many dissenting and conflicting 
voices of Judaism in Deronda to resolve these questions in terms of traditional 
understandings about Judaism.  The key therefore to reconciling Eliot’s Judaisms in 
Deronda lies in differentiating traditional understandings of Judaism from the particular 
version of Judaism that Eliot invokes in the novel:  Kabbalism.7 
Eliot most explicitly engages with Kabbalism during Deronda at the beginning of 
chapter forty-three when Mordecai explains to Deronda his theory about the 
transmigration of souls: 





In the doctrine of the Cabbala, souls are born again and again in new bodies till 
they are perfected and purified, and a soul liberated from a worn-out body may 
join the fellow-soul that needs it, that they may be perfected together, and their 
earthly work accomplished. Then they will depart from the mortal region, and 
leave place for new souls to be born out of the store in the eternal bosom. It is the 
lingering imperfection of the souls already born into the mortal region that hinders 
the birth of new souls and the preparation of the Messianic time.  (Deronda 461) 
This passage demonstrates that Mordecai does not model his metaphysics upon 
traditional Jewish theology.  He never mentions the paternal God of the Hebrew Bible, 
who councils the leaders of the Jews and often intervenes on their behalf.  In fact, he 
effectively replaces the anthropomorphic Hebrew God with a monistic Force that 
perpetuates a cycle of birth and death with a system of merit similar to the concepts of 
Karma and Samsara in Buddhism.  But though Mordecai’s Kabbalism does not cohere 
with traditional Jewish theology, it does synergize well with Eliot’s secular humanism.  
The progress of men and their souls derives from the consequences of human morality 
rather than Divine Judgment.  Kabbalism therefore has the potential to resolve some of 
the paradoxical representations of Judaism in Deronda:  the migration of souls seems to 
transcend exclusivist boundaries, and human ethics supersede divine command.  But 
Mordecai and Deronda do not actualize these ideals and instead perpetuate exclusivism.  
Kabbalism for Eliot therefore offers a Jewish ethical paradigm that incorporates 
inclusivism and humanism, but Judaism in practice has difficulty in realizing these ideals.  
Thus, a crucial question arises:  why would Eliot introduce Kabbalism as an ethical 
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system compatible with universal compassion and yet direct Mordecai and Deronda to 
pursue a quest to re-establish Israel that undermines compassion?  
 Mordecai and Deronda never materialize the potential in Kabbalism for universal 
compassion because they refuse to renounce their egoistic desires for Israel.  Eliot 
denounces the political ramifications of Jewish nationalism during the “terrible moment” 
scene of Deronda, and she also asserts in an 1875 letter to Elma Stuart that the best 
religiosity derives from individual piety rather than the “Great movements of the world”: 
I am very fond of that old Greek saying that the best state is that in which every 
man feels a wrong done to another as if it were done to himself… Caring for the 
just and loving deed of every day in your part of Dinan carries your heart strongly 
to every other part of the world which in its need of love and justice is just in the 
same predicament, and in this way you get a religion which is at once universal 
and private.  (GEL 6: 112) 
According to this letter, to realize universal compassion, Eliot insists that people must 
focus on helping their own neighbors rather than enacting grand-scale revolutionary 
movements.  Eliot transitions her emphasis on the local into a reflection of the self during 
another letter to Oscar Browning in 1875:  “Perhaps the most difficult heroism is that 
which consists in the daily conquests of our private demons, not in the slaying of world-
notorious dragons,” (GEL 6: 126).  Once again, Eliot trumpets the supremacy of 
individual piety over “great religious movements.”  This emphasis on the micro rather 
than the macro matches Eliot’s approach to realism.  Unlike many other realists, such as 
Trollope and Dickens, whose novels often address the macro concerns of a larger society, 
Eliot focuses her ethics on the complexities of local communities.  But though Eliot 
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praises individual piety, she also warns in an 1869 letter to Sophia Hennell that religion 
should not serve as a consolation for the ego: 
One cannot but feel tenderly towards the yearnings of individual sufferers, but 
theoretically speaking, it seems to me that the conception of religion as chiefly 
valuable for the personal consolations that may be extracted from it, is among the 
most active sources of falsity.  The test of a higher religion might be, that it 
should enable the believer to do without the consolations which his egoism would 
demand.  (GEL 5: 68-69) 
Thus, Eliot’s literary aesthetic, secular humanism, and anti-imperialist politics all 
designate individual piety and renunciation of the ego as the best approaches for 
recognizing the interconnectedness of the local with universal compassion. 
Eliot’s emphasis on universal compassion and the renunciation of the ego mirrors 
her secular humanism as expressed in “Dr. Cumming,” and it is consistent with her 
aversion to imperialism.  This critique of egoism appears most conspicuously in Eliot’s 
later fiction as the denunciation of gambling—profiting from the loss of another.  Both 
Rosamond in Middlemarch and Gwendolen in Daniel Deronda serve as the most obvious 
case-studies against egoism, but Eliot does not exonerate her other characters from the 
corruption of egoism.  Even Deronda—the most ostensibly moral character in Deronda—
succumbs to egoism when Mirah compares him to the Buddha in chapter thirty-seven: 
‘Mr. Hans said yesterday that you thought so much of others you hardly wanted 
anything for yourself.  He told us a wonderful story of Bouddha giving himself to 
the famished tigress to save her and her little ones from starving.  And he said you 
were like Bouddha.  That is what we all imagine of you.’ 
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‘Pray don’t imagine that… Even if it were true that I thought so much of others, it 
would not follow that I had no wants for myself.  When Bouddha let the tigress 
eat him he might have been very hungry himself.’ (Deronda 399) 
In Middlemarch, Eliot invokes the Buddha with a facetious tone to describe an 
inconsequential character (Celia’s baby).  In the above passage from Daniel Deronda, 
however, Eliot juxtaposes the Buddha with the central moral force of the novel—
Deronda—and Deronda challenges the ethical merits of the Buddha.  This creates an 
explicit conflict between the ethics of the Buddha and Deronda at this point in the novel, 
and given that Eliot models the Buddha in Deronda on a Buddhist legend that emphasizes 
compassion over worldly ambition,8 Eliot most likely invokes Buddhism as a subtle 
gauge to measure the true compassion of Deronda.  Eliot further justifies this theory 
when she translates in her Pforzheimer Notebooks the Three Refuges of Buddhism 
(Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha) as the Human Ideal, Doctrine, and Social Authority, 
respectively (Notebooks 422).  Thus, the Buddha for Eliot represents the human ideal, 
and since the Buddha sacrifices himself for universal compassion, even towards animals, 
Deronda’s dissent from the Buddha signals that he lacks universal compassion. 
Many scholars have written about Judaism and George Eliot, but few have yet 
explored Buddhism and Eliot.  Despite this dearth of contemporary scholarship, however, 
Buddhism has in fact been recognized as an important cultural phenomenon for centuries 
                                                
8 Eliot draws the metaphor from Eugene Burnouf’s Introduction to Indian Buddhism (1844):  “A young 
Brahman who has retired into the depths of a forest to give himself over, in the interest of living beings… 
gives his body as food to a starving tigress that just gave birth to cubs.  At the moment of committing this 
heroic sacrifice, he exclaims:  ‘How true it is that I do not abandon life for kingship, or for the enjoyments 
of pleasure, or for the rank of Sakra, or for that of sovereign monarch, but rather to reach the supreme state 




by European thinkers as diverse as Marco Polo, Pierre Bayle, and Hegel, but until the 
mid-nineteenth century, Europeans predominantly categorized Buddhism as an Oriental 
superstition synonymous with Taoism and Confucianism (Clarke 74).  The advent of 
British imperialism, however, forced Europeans to interact with Buddhists in a more 
substantial capacity, and the linguistic study of Sinhalese and Tibetan languages revealed 
that Buddhism was not an amorphous superstition but rather a distinct engagement with 
an intricate religious system.  This allure of exotic new languages and Buddhist culture 
drew Hungarian linguist Alexander Csoma to Tibet in 1823 (Lussier 101).  Upon his 
arrival, Csoma befriended a venerated Buddhist monk named Sangye Puntsog and 
became the first European to access the entire Tibetan canon of Buddhist writings 
(Lussier 101).  Csoma studied the Buddhist canon for a decade under the direction of 
Puntsog, and he began publishing in 1832 the first Tibetan-English dictionary as well as 
numerous translations of Tibetan works in the Journal of the Asiatick Society of Bengal 
(Lussier 103).  The English imperial officer Brian Hodgson also published substantial 
translations of Buddhist texts in 1837 (Clarke 74).  Eugene Burnouf then studied the 
writings of Csoma and Hodgson and wrote in 1844 Introduction to the History of Indian 
Buddhism—a landmark work of scholarship that captivated many European intellectuals, 
including Schopenhauer and Wagner (Franklin 12).  Schopenhauer then appended an 
extensive encomium for Buddhism in the supplement to the second edition of The World 
as Will and Representation in 1844 (Clarke 76).  Several decades later, Wagner, inspired 
by Schopenhauer and Burnouf, described himself as a Buddhist and composed Parsifal—
his final opera based on the Buddhist theme of renunciation that he explored in an 
unpublished opera (The Victor), which celebrated the life of the Buddha (Clarke 77).  
 
 47 
Thus, under the leadership of Burnouf and several titans of the European intelligentsia, 
Buddhism became a popular sensation by the end of the 1850s. 
 Victorians met the popularization of Buddhism with ambivalence.  Many 
prominent scholars, such as Max Mueller, praised Buddhism for promoting universal 
compassion, but others, such as Marx, accused Buddhism of encouraging nihilism 
(Clarke 73).  Despite the reservations of some critics, however, Buddhism found an 
attentive audience with the Victorians for several reasons.  First, Buddhism appealed to 
many Victorians because the Buddhist split from Hinduism paralleled the Protestant split 
from the Catholic Church (Franklin 20).  Both Protestants and Buddhists sought greater 
freedoms for impoverished social classes; both valued intent over doctrine; and both 
maintained less rigorous precepts for the laity and emphasized greater compatibility with 
different cultures.  Many Victorians may have scoffed at the metaphysics of Buddhism, 
but they empathized with the religious politics of the Buddha.  Similarly, the moral 
outlook of the historical Buddha enamored Victorians (Franklin 20).  The Buddha 
emphasized the renunciation of individual desire and the cultivation of universal 
compassion.  The Buddha’s call for greater awareness of the social good, rather than 
private gain, would have appealed to many Victorians, as evidenced by the passage of 
numerous social reform acts in the mid-nineteenth century.  Even outspoken critics of 
Buddhism, such as Jules Saint-Hilaire, who at one point denounces Buddhism as an 
anathema (Saint-Hilaire 17), extolled the historical Buddha as an exemplar of virtue 
surpassed only by Jesus (Saint-Hilaire 14). 
The final and perhaps most important quality of Buddhism that captivated 
Victorians was the secular foundation of its ethical system (Franklin 21).  Victorians in 
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the mid-nineteenth century emphasized the Buddha as a mortal man who discovered ideal 
morality through introspection rather than divine decree.  Buddhism became for many 
Victorians a major world religion that practiced a respectable ethical system without 
necessitating a god as a source for those ethics.  Asian Buddhists did often incorporate 
god(s) into their religious expression, but many Victorians purged the Asian gods from 
Buddhism and reduced Buddhism to familiar European philosophies, such as humanism 
(Franklin 21).  Thus, Buddhism became another secular alternative to the Judeo-Christian 
worldview. 
Buddhism intrigued Victorians with Protestant politics, universal compassion, and 
secular ethics, but many Europeans still considered Buddhism largely irrelevant to the 
modern intellectual landscape.  A growing contingent of European intellectuals, however, 
began utilizing the new methods of Higher Criticism during the 1860s to speculate that 
Buddhism may have influenced the historical development of Christianity.  For example, 
Louis Jacolliot claimed in Bible dans l’Inde (1868) that Jesus studied Buddhism in India 
during his unaccounted years and that the Cult of Christ mirrors the Indian Cult of 
Krishna (Clarke 81).  Similarly, Emile Burnouf claimed in his The Science of Religions 
(1872) that the “Spirit of Christ” pre-dates Judaism (68) and that the concept of Christ 
may in fact originate from early Buddhist rituals regarding the god of the hearth—Agni 
(153).  Some anti-Semitic intellectuals, such as Wagner and Friedrich Schlegel, used this 
possibility of Buddhism influencing Christianity to marginalize the impact of Judaism on 
the cultural history of Europe (Clarke 78).  They reasoned that if Buddhism inspired 
Jesus to break from Jewish Law in the same way that the Buddha renounced Hinduism, 
then the Jews were an impediment to the ethical progress of humanity.  Other proponents 
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of Higher Criticism, such as Max Mueller, claimed that “religion” is a mental faculty 
innate in all humans and that comparing religious expressions should help scholars 
understand connections in the human condition (Mueller 17).  Mueller summarizes his 
call for inclusivism as “any one who knows one religion knows none” (Mueller 16).  
Mueller would claim that discovering parallels between Christianity and Buddhism does 
not obviate the relationship between Judaism and Christianity, but rather it increases our 
knowledge of all three religions.  Thus, Buddhism in England transitioned during the 
1860s from an irrelevant philosophy into a possible progenitor for Christianity and the 
cultural history of Europe. 
 Buddhism fascinated George Eliot for the same reasons that it captivated many 
Victorians.  It offered an atheistic religion that exalted human compassion, and it also 
maintained a karmic cycle known as Samsara that interconnected all living things with a 
cultural memory similar to Mordecai’s Kabalistic vision Judaism.  It is important to 
remember, however, that many European commentators on Buddhism during the 
Victorian era paid little attention to the practices and beliefs of actual Buddhists—who 
often incorporated Buddhism into a syncretic spirituality.  For example, it would not be 
unusual for a Tibetan Buddhist to also worship local gods or enact Taoist rituals.  Eastern 
religiosity was still highly holistic, and Buddhism in practice did not often observe the 
regimented theology of its sacred texts, which were the basis for many European 
commentators on Buddhism, such as Eugene and Emile Burnouf.  Nevertheless, though 
Europeans often overlooked the impact of local cultures on Buddhist expression, the 
ostensible atheism of Buddhism allowed Buddhism in the European imagination to blend 
well with other cultures and religions.  Thus, many nineteenth-century intellectuals began 
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speculating that Buddhism may have contributed to Western culture in hitherto 
unexamined ways. 
 George Eliot did not adopt the anti-Semitism of Emile Burnouf and other 
Buddhist apologists who sought to replace the cultural significance of the Jews with new 
theories of Aryanism, but she did demonstrate an interest in the possibility that Buddhism 
influenced the development of Western culture.  In the Pforzheimer Notebooks, for 
example, Eliot examines the apocryphal text Barlaam and Josaphat from Henry Yule’s 
translation of the travel writings of Marco Polo:  The Book of Ser Marco Polo, the 
Venetian (1872).  According to the narrative, Saint Thomas converts the people of India 
to Christianity, but a pagan king named Abbener rises to power and persecutes 
Christians, particularly the ascetics.  Then Prince Josaphat, Abbener’s son, is born, and 
during his early adulthood, he witnesses the suffering of a sick man and an old man (Yule 
2: 306).  Next, an ascetic monk named Baarlam infiltrates the palace and unfolds to 
Josaphat the transcendent power of Christianity.  Josaphat converts and uses Christianity 
to spread prosperity across his kingdom (Yule 2: 307).  After a successful reign, Josaphat 
renounces the royal throne and reunites with Baarlam in the wilderness.  Josaphat and 
Baarlam devote the remainder of their lives to introspection and die in peace (Yule 2: 
307). 
The biography of Josaphat aligns well with the story of the Buddha.  Both are 
princes, live in India, and renounce their political powers to search for enlightenment 
through introspection.  Eliot acknowledges these similarities between the Buddha and 
Josaphat in her Notebooks (468).  In addition, Yule notes in his translation that several 
other scholars have identified connections between Buddhism and Barlaam and 
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Josaphat, including Diego de Couto and Eduoard Laboulaye, and he insists that Barlaam 
and Josaphat is not an obscure text but rather an important work with historical 
consequence (Yule 2: 308).  He claims that the tale originated from John of Damascus in 
the eighth century CE (Yule 2: 305), but it did not become popular with the Christian 
Church until Simeon the Metaphrast speculated around the eleventh-century CE that 
Barlaam and Josaphat were saints (Yule 2: 307).  The tale then appears in the thirteenth-
century history Speculum Historiale by Vincent of Beauvais, and it also plays a 
prominent role in the Golden Legend (Yule 2: 308).  Furthermore, both Cardinal 
Baronius and Pope Gregory XIII of the sixteenth century comment on the story, and 
Barlaam and Josaphat are officially celebrated in Roman Martyrology on November 
twenty-seventh (Yule 2: 307).  Yule even presents in his notes for the translation of 
Marco Polo a German drawing from 1477 that illustrates Josaphat as a Christian saint 
(Yule 2: 309).  Yule concludes that the fascination of the Catholic Church with the story 
of the Buddha inspired several of the most influential writers of the later medieval and 
early modern periods, including Boccaccio, Shakespeare, and John Gower (Yule 2: 305).  
Thus, Eliot’s reading of and extensive notes about Yule’s account of Barlaam and 
Josaphat demonstrate her interest in narratives that incorporate Buddhism into the 
development of Western culture. 
Yule’s account of Barlaam and Josaphat establishes the presence of Buddhism in 
Christian thought beginning around the eighth-century CE, but did Eliot read any sources 
that would have convinced her that Buddhism influenced Western culture even earlier?  
Several such narratives existed, most of which attributed the origin of Buddhism in the 
West to cultural exchanges along trade routes between India and ancient Greece.  Henry 
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Mansel in The Gnostic Heresies of the First and Second Centuries (1875) argues that 
Buddhist missionaries visited Egypt no later than two generations after Alexander the 
Great (Mansel 31),9 and he cites historical accounts from Philo to contend that Buddhism 
appears most noticeably in the Therapeutae Jewish community in Alexandria in the form 
of contemplative meditation and asceticism.10  Henry Milman, whom Eliot mentions in 
the Notebooks (508), agrees in The History of Christianity (1871) that Buddhism 
influenced early Gnostic communities, and he claims that the doctrine of the Sephiroth in 
the Kaballah derives from Buddhist ideas (Milman 37).  Finally, Charles King asserts in 
Gnostics and Their Remains (1864) that a Babylonian trader named Scythius became 
inspired by Buddhist teachings while traveling in India, and he composed four texts 
delineating his new spiritual outlook (King 16).11  Scythius presented his teachings to the 
original Christian apostles, but their answers did not satisfy him (King 17).  He then 
blended his ideas with taboo beliefs about magic, and after Scythius died by “accidently” 
falling off his roof, his servant Terbinthus took possession of his teachings and renamed 
himself “Budda” after studying the texts (King 18).12  King also speculates that 
Buddhism inspired the esoteric beliefs of Pythagoras (17), and he adds that the Edicts of 
Asoka confirm that Buddhists had visited Egypt before the third century BCE (King 













23).13  Thus, given the preponderance of Victorian theories and historical evidence that 
linked Buddhism with the formation of several Gnostic communities, it is extremely 
probable that Eliot credited the origins of at least some ideas in Kabbalism (a Gnostic 
rendition of Judaism) with Buddhism. 
 Many Eliot scholars underestimate the impact that these conversations about 
Buddhism and Western culture had on the formation of Eliot’s notion of the Kaballah in 
Deronda.  Avrom Fleishman claims that Eliot drew her inspiration for the Kaballah in 
Deronda from Emmanuel Deutsch and Leopold Zunz (Fleishman 191).  Deutsch and 
Zunz believed that Kabbalism began in the thirteenth century from the teachings of Rabbi 
Moses de Leon, who derived his theology from an ancient manuscript known as the 
Zohar, which was written by Simon ben Jochai around 70 CE.  Eliot indeed read 
Deutsche and Zunz, but she also read other Jewish theologians who debated the origins 
and authenticity of the Kaballah.  Christian Ginsburg in The Kaballah: Its Doctrines 
Development and Literature (1865) argues that Moses de Leon composed the Zohar in 
the thirteenth-century, despite claims within the Zohar itself that the text was written by 
Simon ben Jochai around the fall of the Second Jewish Temple in 70 CE (Ginsburg 84). 14   
Ginsburg lists several reasons for attributing authorship of the Zohar to Leon and not 
Jochai.  First, the Zohar contains numerous anachronisms that refute the possibility that 
Jochai composed the text.  For example, the Zohar contends that the “Mahommedans” 
would claim Israel for awhile before the children of Ishmael would rise to reclaim the 
holy land (Ginsburg 87).  A first century Rabbi would have had no knowledge of these 






allusions to the medieval crusades, and even if he predicted a future religious war, 
Muhammad as a name held no significance until the rise of Islam in the seventh-century.  
Furthermore, the Zohar incorporates complete quotations from previous literary works 
published well after Jochai, such as two complete verses from Ibn Gebirol’s The Royal 
Diadem (1070) (Ginsburg 86).  Finally, a wealthy merchant offered to pay a generous 
sum for the original Zohar manuscript upon the death of Moses de Leon, but Leon’s 
widow admitted that Leon was the original composer of the Zohar.  She confessed that 
Leon had fabricated Simon ben Jochai as the author in order to sell more copies of the 
text (Ginsburg 91).  Thus, Ginsburg concludes that the Kaballah originated in the 
thirteenth-century and that Moses de Leon invented the concepts of En Soph, the 
Sephiroth, and the transmigration of souls (Ginsburg 89). 
 If Moses de Leon invented the Jewish concept of soul transmigration, then 
Buddhism played no discernible role in the formation of the Kaballah.  Eliot, however, 
would likely doubt that Leon composed the entire Zohar without drawing on at least 
some ideas from the East, given the popularity of Barlaam and Josaphat during the 
Medieval era and given the Victorian theories of Buddhist cultural exchange with the 
West by authors such as Mansel, Milman, and King.  Furthermore, as a student of Higher 
Criticism, Eliot understood the transcription process of ancient texts, and she knew that 
anachronisms and other forms of corruption inevitably contaminate the message of 
original manuscripts.  Jochai could not have written about the crusades or Gebirol’s 
poem, but scribes could have inserted these interpolations just as easily as Leon.  In 
addition, Adolphe Franck in The Kaballah:  or Religious Philosophy of the Hebrews 
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(1843) provides Eliot with several more reasons to doubt Ginsburg.15   First, the Zohar is 
too complex to have been constructed by one man over a short period of time.  The 
theosophy of the text would require a vast knowledge of multiple cultures—a luxury that 
would not have been available to a poor Jewish man in thirteenth-century Spain (Franck 
107).  Furthermore, Leon wrote his version of the Zohar in Aramaic, but Franck observes 
that the Arabians have no concept analogous to the Sephiroth.  God only reveals himself 
in one way, and the concept of multiple emanations derives from Gnostic sources, not 
Arabian mystics (Franck 107).  Franck therefore concludes that the Zohar must have 
originated from antiquity (Franck 307), and given the abundance weaknesses in 
Ginsburg’s argument, Eliot most likely agreed with Franck. 
 Franck speculates at the end of his work that the doctrines of Kabbalism probably 
derive from Babylonian mysticism, but he admits that the teachings of Philo share a great 
number of ideas with Kabbalism (Franck 306).  This should not be surprising, since Philo 
was also a Jewish philosopher contemporaneous with the author of the Zohar, as stated 
by the text itself—Simon ben Jochai.  Franck, however, claims that Alexandrian Jews 
(Philo) would have had little communication and cultural exchange with Palestinian 
Jews, such as Jochai (Franck 306), but this theory of isolationism is absurd.  Rome was at 
the height of its imperialism in the first-century CE, and Palestine served as an epicenter 
for several prominent trade routes.  King’s story of Scythius illustrates a scenario in 
which these trade routes helped facilitate cultural exchanges between different Jewish 
factions as well as introducing Buddhist ideas to the West.  Egyptians and Palestinians 
therefore undoubtedly interacted with each other, particularly the Jewish communities, 




who shared similar beliefs and cultures, and therefore, the similarities between the 
teachings of Philo and Jochai indicate a common source of inspiration rather than mere 
coincidence, as Franck implies. 
Arthur Lillie in Buddhism in Christendom (1887) argues that this common source 
was probably the Essenes.  Lillie clarifies that within the diverse Essene community, the 
Therapeutae were the most likely influence upon Philo, and he lists several observations 
by Philo that designate elements of a common religiosity shared by both the Therapeutae 
and Buddhists.  First, the Therapeutae abandoned their families for a life of pure 
contemplation (Lillie 78).  Although some individual Jewish mystics pursued the ascetic 
lifestyle, no sect other than the Essenes condoned the permanent abandonment of the 
family, but this austere life of contemplation had existed in Indian Buddhism for 
centuries.  Philo also noted that the Therapeutae enforced strict vegetarianism and 
refrained from any alcoholic beverages, including wine (Lillie 77).  According to Lillie, 
these dietary restrictions were foreign to most Jews, but they were standard in Indian 
Buddhism.  In addition to the accounts of Philo, Lillie also invokes Josephus as an 
additional ancient historian who observes Essene practices that resemble Buddhism.   
According to Josephus, the Essenes forbade slavery, war, revenge, and worldly longings 
(Lillie 78).  The Jews waged many wars in the Hebrew Bible, but Buddhists were 
pacifists, at least in the Victorian construction of them.  Josephus also observed that the 
Essenes often excommunicated troublesome monks rather than holding them accountable 
to punitive laws.  This practice mirrors the Buddhist Sangha and diverges from strict 
Hebrew code of Law.  Lillie wrote Buddhism in Christendom well after George Eliot 
died, but given Eliot’s familiarity with Philo and Josephus, it is probable that she 
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reasoned at least some of the conclusions that he draws.  Also, Eliot confirms in the 
Notebooks that the doctrine of the transmigration of souls in Judaism pre-dates 
Kabbalism, and she references both Philo and Josephus to claim that the Essenes were the 
first Jews to adopt the idea (Notebooks 455). 
Eliot further reflects upon Buddhism in other sections of her Notebooks as well.  
She describes a “Bouddha” as wise and awakened, and she asserts that the title derives 
from “boudh,” which means “to know” (Notebooks 403).  This emphasis on human 
wisdom rather than esoteric dispensation matches Eliot’s secular humanism.  In addition, 
Eliot does not reserve the status of Buddhahood for a particular historical figure but 
rather imagines Buddhahood to be an attainable state of mind for anyone with proper 
training.  Eliot makes this inclusivism of Buddhism explicit when she describes the 
Buddha as “he who walks in the paths of his predecessors, the former Bouddhas,” 
(Notebooks 403).  The plurality of this description (paths, predecessors, Bouddhas) 
suggests that Buddhism is compatible with multiple cultures.  This compatibility of 
Buddhism with multiple cultures fosters the universal compassion that Eliot prizes.  
Buddhism for Eliot also articulates an ethical system that renounces political nationalism.  
She captures these qualities of inclusivism and pacifism when she calls the Buddha 
“Sakyamouni.”  Eliot’s spelling of “Bouddha” and “Sakyamouni” with an “ou” in her 
notebooks and Deronda itself situates her within French scholarship, and we know that 
Eliot read Introduction to the History of Indian Buddhism by Eugene Burnouf—a premier 
French scholar on Buddhism in the nineteenth century (Notebooks 276).   Thus, Eliot 
most likely draws her translation of “Sakyamouni” from Burnouf, and he translates 
“Sakya” to mean the warrior caste of India and “mouni” to mean recluse (Burnouf 115).  
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Thus, the Buddha is the “recluse of the warrior class,” and this epithet implies a 
disassociation from any particular socio-political order.  Eliot’s emphasis on the Buddha 
as a man who achieves supreme wisdom through his own volition distinguishes 
Buddhism from the Judeo-Christian traditions of Europe in which God serves as the 
source of wisdom.  Buddhist compassion for Eliot requires no divine mediation.  The 
Buddha is the “human ideal” (Notebooks 422), and his teachings about universal 





















As John Lord observed in Beacon Lights of History, George Eliot writes “almost like a 
follower of the Buddha” (4: 388-89).  Eliot never declared herself a Buddhist, but she did 
admire the Buddhist ethic of universal compassion.  Two qualities of Buddhism in 
particular attracted Eliot:  the transmigration of souls, and a human basis for compassion.  
These attributes synergized well with her secular humanism and offered her a blueprint 
for a cultural heritage that transcends national politics. 
Eliot centered Daniel Deronda upon Judaism, but she chose to model the Judaism 
in the novel on Kabbalism—an esoteric version of Judaism that shares many ideas with 
Buddhism.  Most notably, Kabbalism painted a vision of Judaism in which Jews discover 
God through a teleological process of discovery and cultural inheritance.  Traditional 
narratives of Judaism in the Hebrew Bible often portray the Jews as a chosen race that 
follows the explicit commands of God, but in Kabbalism, as represented by Mordecai in 
Deronda, Jews refine their knowledge about God through a process of the transmigration 
of souls and cultural inheritance.  God does not command the Good, but rather Jews must 
discover the Good through relationships with other people.  This emphasis on humanity 
rather than the Divine in Kabbalism did not necessarily derive from Buddhist trade routes 
around the first century CE, but given numerous Victorian narratives about the cultural 
exchanges between the Buddhists and the West around that time, Eliot would have 
attributed the transmigration of souls in Kabbalism to a Buddhist origin. 
It is important to remember, however, that although Eliot endorsed the cultural 
inheritance modeled by Kabbalism, she did not condone the establishment of a modern 
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Jewish State.  Numerous personal letters contemporaneous with Deronda confirm that 
she disapproved of any culture that attempts to encroach on the freedom of others.  
Furthermore, Deronda itself presents numerous warnings against Deronda’s mission to 
re-establish Israel.  The most prominent of these warnings occurs when Deronda informs 
Gwendolen that he will rally the Jews in the East.  Immediately following his declaration, 
Eliot paints an apocalyptic vision in which humanity suffers under the oppression from 
his “wide stretching purpose” (689).  In addition, Mordecai, Deronda, and Gideon all 
represent separate visions of Judaism, and Gwendolen, who is not Jewish at all, occupies 
roughly half of the narrative.  Thus, Eliot does not endorse the political movement to 
create a Jewish State.  She does, however, believe that a national consciousness is 
necessary to stave off cosmopolitan indifference.  The Jews should cherish the teleology 
of cultural continuity presented by Kabbalism, but the apocalyptic scene when Deronda 
decides to pursue his mission suggests that an actual political movement to forge a Jewish 
State would be tantamount to other historical atrocities of religious fervor. 
 Eliot incorporates Buddhist ideas into Deronda to negotiate the tension between 
Jewish cultural heritage and the difficulty of realizing universal compassion while 
pursuing a political movement to establish a modern Jewish State.  Judaism for Eliot 
represents a religion with a rich cultural heritage to combat Victorian cosmopolitanism, 
but traditional Judaism relies too much upon exclusivism to foster universal compassion.  
Conversely, secular humanism for Eliot offers a vision universal compassion similar to 
Buddhism, but without any grounding in a particular cultural heritage, secular humanism 
risks succumbing to cosmopolitanism.  Buddhism in the Victorian imagination negotiates 
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this conflict by encouraging cultural heritage, the renunciation of egoism, and the 
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